INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR ZERO

The disappointingly slow pace of progress on efforts to prevent proliferation, reduce nuclear weapons, and eliminate nuclear risks has many causes. The factor that might be easiest for individuals in the arms control and nonproliferation community to change stems from their own ambivalence about major questions that must be addressed on the road to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to zero. This essay explores how ambivalence about four key issues—strategic stability, alliance relations, institution-building, and nuclear energy—often leads community members to take positions that play well at home and within their like-minded group but raise unintended impediments to achieving their own long-term goals. The author suggests alternative ways to handle these questions to improve the prospects for domestic and international agreement on practical measures that would eliminate, not perpetuate, nuclear risks.     

ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The current nuclear nonproliferation order is no longer sustainable. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has weakened considerably over the years, with nuclear have-nots displaying increased dissatisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, demands for civilian nuclear technology have led to increased proliferation risks in the form of dual-use technologies. Arms control as we currently understand it—piecemeal treaties and agreements—is no longer sufficient to address the growing threat of proliferation and the frailty of the NPT. This article calls for a bolder nonproliferation agenda pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is, in fact, technologically achievable; a lack of political will stands as the only remaining roadblock to a world free of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of the technological feasibility of disarmament, as well as recognition of the diminishing strategic value of nuclear weapons, will help to erode this political reluctance.     

舰炮弹丸对零航路捷径超声速导弹的侵彻分析

以零航路捷径下小口径舰炮弹丸对超声速反舰导弹的侵彻毁伤效果为研究方向,仿真计算了零航路捷径下小口径舰炮弹丸与超声速反舰导弹的交汇姿态,建立了反舰导弹模型,在此基础上就不同侵彻部位及交汇角度条件下小口径舰炮弹丸对超声速反舰导弹的侵彻毁伤效果进行了有限元仿真,得出了具有统计意义的仿真结果,总结了弹丸无法毁伤导弹战斗部的几点因素。研究对有效评价小口径舰炮弹丸对超声速反舰导弹的毁伤效果以及对导弹整体的易损性分析提供了理论参考。     

New results on a stochastic duel game with each force consisting of heterogeneous units

Two forces engage in a duel, with each force initially consisting of several heterogeneous units. Each unit can be assigned to fire at any opposing unit, but the kill rate depends on the assignment. As the duel proceeds, each force—knowing which units are still alive in real time—decides dynamically how to assign its fire, in order to maximize the probability of wiping out the opposing force before getting wiped out. It has been shown in the literature that an optimal pure strategy exists for this two‐person zero‐sum game, but computing the optimal strategy remained cumbersome because of the game's huge payoff matrix. This article gives an iterative algorithm to compute the optimal strategy without having to enumerate the entire payoff matrix, and offers some insights into the special case, where one force has only one unit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 56–65, 2014     

The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

卫星差分码偏差对北斗三号双频精密单点定位的影响

为探讨北斗三号系统不同频点组合卫星差分码偏差(differential code bias, DCB)对精密单点定位(precise point positioning, PPP)的影响,推导北斗三号系统不同频点无电离层组合卫星端DCB改正模型,并基于MGEX跟踪站连续7天4站的观测数据按7种不同双频组合进行DCB改正实验。结果表明,DCB改正对PPP精度在最初的历元有明显提升,有助于滤波的收敛及提高单天解的均方根,但对于最终定位精度无明显提升。B2a/B3I及B2b/B3I组合定位精度及收敛速度明显低于其他组合,DCB改正后有所提升。其他5种组合改正后定位精度及收敛时间相当：静态PPP单天解均方根在E、N和U方向约为5.50 cm、2.50 cm和6.25 cm,较未改正前提升20%～65%;平均收敛时间为38 min,提升约6%;动态PPP平均收敛时间为59 min,提升约20%;最终定位精度水平方向优于5 cm,高程方向优于7 cm。     

纯方位偏差补偿估计算法研究

众所周知,纯方位伪线性估计有着严重的偏差问题。以伪线性估计的理论模型为基础,研究它在纯方位问题中的应用。将伪线性估计的偏差分离出来,形成偏差补偿估计,对这种估计方法进行仿真计算,并与伪线性估计相比较,经蒙特卡罗仿真研究,其估计偏差确实比伪线性估计小,算法性能反映在一些典型态势上。     

一类二阶Hamilton系统周期解的存在性

Hamilton系统是非线性科学中的一个重要领域,很多人在超二次或次二次条件及其他一些条件下对Hamilton系统的周期解进行了研究。此文则研究了非自制二阶Hamilton系统在零点局部环绕及“非二次”条件下周期解的存在性,并利用局部紧性条件(C)条件以及极大极小方法证明了其周期解的存在性。     

单平台三维传感器组网配准的最小二乘法

针对单平台多部三维传感器组网的校准和姿态偏差给出了一种综合估计算法。根据不同传感器跟踪相同目标时的空中叠合条件,由一阶泰勒展式导出了相对偏差的线性化公式,再利用最小二乘法实时估计出传感器量测间存在的偏差,从而进行配准。本算法对传感器近距离组网或者单舰多传感器组网的配准具有较好的精度和稳健性。     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006